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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Florida Legislature enacted a statute providing counsel to children 
in certain categories in dependency cases, and also passed a statute removing 
the nexus requirement to prove grounds for termination of parental rights.1   
Both laws are a substantial departure from prior practice and contain serious 
flaws, which are discussed in this survey.2  The Supreme Court of Florida ruled 
on one case during the past year, interpreting Florida’s speedy trial rule in 
juvenile delinquency cases.3  Intermediate appellate courts remained active both 
in the delinquency area and in the dependency field.4  This survey reviews and 
analyzes the new laws and the significant reported opinions in these areas.5 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center. 
 This survey covers cases decided during the period from July 1, 2013 through June 30, 2014.  
The author thanks Law Review Subscriptions Editor, Richard Nelson, for his help in the 
preparation of this survey. 
1. FLA.  STAT. §§ 39.01305, .806(1)(f), (h) (2014); FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(f), (h) 
(2013). 
2. See FLA. STAT. §§ 39.01305, .806(1)(f), (h) (2014); FLA. STAT. § 39.806 
(2013); infra Part VII. 
3. State v. S.A., 133 So. 3d 506, 507 (Fla. 2014) (per curiam). 
4. E.g., Weiand v. State, 129 So. 3d 434, 434 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
5. See infra Parts I–V. 
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II. DEPENDENCY 
Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes and the Florida Juvenile Rules of 
Civil Procedure provide for notice and an opportunity to be heard at multiple 
points in the dependency proceeding, including sections of chapter 39 that 
provide that, unless parental rights have been terminated, parents must be 
notified of all proceedings and hearings involving the child.6  Despite the clear 
language of chapter 39 and the Rules of Juvenile Procedure, the Second District 
Court of Appeal was obligated to reverse in In re J.B. v. Department of 
Children & Family Services7 because the trial court failed to give the parents 
adequate notice and an opportunity to prepare for a permanency hearing.8  The 
appeal involved a dependency proceeding in which the parents did not comply 
with the case plan, and a scheduled judicial review was set.9  Before the hearing, 
the Department, according to the appellate court, “apparently abandoned the 
goal of reunification and decided to seek a permanent guardianship.”10  Because 
the hearing was noticed as a judicial review and not a permanency hearing, the 
parents knew nothing about the change in plans.11  In fact, “[f]orty-three pages 
into the transcript—[according to the appellate court]—the Department first 
explained that it actually wanted an order at the conclusion of [the] hearing 
establishing a permanent guardianship and a termination of supervision.”12  
Over the objections of the child’s father’s attorney, the trial court proceeded 
with the matter, apparently not seeming to understand the impact of its ruling.13 
 The appellate court reversed.14 
In dependency proceedings in Florida, by statute, the parties are:  The 
parents, the Department of Children and Families, the Guardian Ad Litem 
(“GAL”) Program or a representative of the GAL Program if appointed, the 
child, and the petitioner, whether the Department or someone else.15  Chapter 39 
                                                 
6. FLA. STAT. § 39.502(1) (2014); FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.045(h); FLA. R. JUV. P. 
8.225(f)(1) (providing notice).  When these rules do not require specific notice, all parties will be 
given reasonable notice of any hearings.  FLA. STAT. § 39.502(1). 
7. 130 So. 3d 753 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
8. In re J.B., 130 So. 3d at 754, 757; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.502(1); FLA. R. 
JUV. P. 8.225(f)(1). 
9. In re J.B., 130 So. 3d at 754. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. at 754–55. 
12. Id. at 755. 
13. Id. at 755–56. 
14. In re J.B., 130 So. 3d at 757. 
15. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(51) (2014).  For a discussion of the roles of the parties in 
Florida see Michael J. Dale & Louis M. Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children in 
Dependency and Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings in Florida:  The Issue Updated, 35 
NOVA L. REV. 305, 323–32 (2011). 
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also recognizes that in child welfare proceedings in Florida, a participant may 
also be involved in the case.16  A participant is defined as a non-party who 
receives notice of hearing and “includ[es] the actual custodian of the child, the 
foster parents, . . . the legal custodian of the child, identified prospective 
parents, and any other person whose participation may be in the best interest of 
the child.”17  A mother of five children in D.C. v. J.M.18 filed a writ of certiorari 
in the appellate court to quash a pre-trial order on the foster parent’s motion to 
intervene.19  The trial court’s order provided that, in addition to the other 
parties, the foster parent’s attorney would have the right to unfettered review of 
all court files in the case.20  The mother, the GAL Program, and the attorney ad 
litem for one of the half siblings all objected and joined in the writ.21  They 
claimed an invasion of privacy rights by the third party foster parent.22  
Recognizing that chapter 39 does not allow foster parents to receive every 
record in a confidential dependency case and that the order departed from an 
essential constitutional requirement, the appellate court granted the writ and 
quashed the trial court order.23 
In any dependency proceeding, of course, the petitioner must prove the 
allegations contained in the petition by a preponderance of the evidence.24  In 
H.C. v. Department of Children & Family Services,25 a father appealed from an 
order adjudicating the children dependent based upon a finding of abuse, in that 
there were bruises on one of his children’s left side as well as a purple loop 
mark.26  The case arose when the children’s mother, who was separated from the 
father, noticed the mark after the children returned from the father’s care.27  
“The [court’s] expert, . . . a nurse practitioner with the University of Miami’s 
Child Protection [Unit],28 testified that,” in her opinion, the “injury 
‘represent[ed] child physical abuse.’”29  The problem was that there was no 
                                                 
16. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(50). 
17. Id. 
18. 133 So. 3d 1080 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
19. Id. at 1081. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. FLA. STAT. § 39.0132(3) (2014); D.C., 133 So. 3d at 1081–82. 
24. FLA. STAT. § 39.507(1)(b). 
25. 141 So. 3d 243 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
26. Id. at 243. 
27. Id. at 244. 
28. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.303(1)(e).  The Child Protection Units are 
operated by the State’s Health Department to medically evaluate possible child abuse and neglect. 
 See FLA. STAT. § 39.303(1). 
29. H.C., 141 So. 3d at 244. 
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evidence of who did it.30  As the appellate court explained, “the record is 
completely devoid of any evidence that the [f]ather caused [the child’s] 
injuries.”31  Thus, the court of appeals found that the petitioner, “the 
Department, failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
[f]ather” probably was the person who inflicted the injuries, and, on that basis, it 
reversed.32 
An issue which regularly arises in the dependency context in Florida is 
whether the neglect or abuse of one child is sufficient, in and of itself, to prove 
that a parent’s other children are also dependent.33  The case law, going back 
twenty years, requires that there must be a nexus between the injuries to one 
child, or other neglect of that child, and proof that the other children are 
dependent.34  This was the issue in W.R. v. Department of Children & 
Families,35 a case in which “[a] father appeal[ed] [from] an order [declaring] his 
. . . children dependent.”36  The appellate court affirmed as to one child, but 
reversed as to the other.37   The finding by the trial court as to the second child 
was based upon “one incident where the father struck the child,” but there was 
no evidence of harm.38  There was not even a bruise.39  Relying on the body of 
prior case law, the appellate court explained that, “[t]he trial court failed to 
make any finding [with] regard[] to the risk of imminent abuse,” and failed to 
show there was “a nexus between the parent’s abuse of the one child and the 
risk of abuse of [the other] child.”40  Significantly, the Florida Legislature 
statutorily removed the nexus requirement during the 2014 Legislative 
Session.41  Whether the removal is constitutional is described in Part VII, 
Legislative Changes.42 
                                                 
30. Id. at 245. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. E.g., R.F. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families (In re M.F.), 770 So. 2d 1189, 
1193 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam). 
34. Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla. 
1991); W.R. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 137 So. 3d 1078, 1079 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2014); C.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. (In re S.M.), 997 So. 2d 513, 515 (Fla. 2d Dist. 
Ct. App. 2008). 
35. 137 So. 3d 1078 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
36. Id. at 1079. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. W.R., 137 So. 3d at 1079–80. 
41. Compare FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(f) (2014), with FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(f) 
(2013). 
42. See infra Part VII. 
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As noted earlier, foster parents can be participants in dependency 
proceedings.43  As the recipients of children who are in the state-operated foster 
care system, foster parents are required to comply with licensing regulations.44  
In Sanders v. Department of Children & Families,45 foster parents appealed 
from a decision of the Department of Children and Families revoking their 
foster care license on the basis of a hearing officer’s recommendation.46  The 
case arose from the foster parents’ employment of corporal punishment on a 
foster child in their house.47  Admitting that they struck the child, causing a 
bruise visible several days later, the foster parents on appeal claimed that the 
action of the Department interfered with their religious curriculum or teachings 
in violation of Florida law.48  The appellate court affirmed the decision of the 
Department.49  It held that Florida law does not deprive “the Department of the 
authority to prohibit corporal punishment,” and that appellants’ claim of 
invasion of their religious rights must fail because they should not have entered 
into the contract if they believed that the contract violated their constitutional 
rights.50 
During the course of a dependency proceeding, often after adjudication 
and the disposition, a parent may make a motion for reunification.51  When the 
parent does so, the court shall hold a hearing in which the “parent [is obligated 
to] demonstrate that the safety, [welfare], and physical, mental, and emotional 
health of the [parent’s] child” will not suffer from endangerment by the 
change.52  In a rather simple case on appeal, A.M. v. Department of Children & 
Families,53 a mother appealed from a trial court’s denial of a motion for 
reunification.54  Apparently, there was no evidence in the record that the mother, 
through counsel, actually moved for reunification.55  Nor was there an order 
                                                 
43. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(50) (2014); see also supra notes 15–17 and accompanying 
text. 
44. Sanders v. Dep’t Children & Families, 118 So. 3d 899, 901 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. 
App. 2013); see also FLA. STAT. § 409.175(1)(b). 
45. 118 So. 3d 899 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
46. Id. at 900. 
47. Id. 
48. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 409.175(1)(b). 
49. Sanders, 118 So. 3d at 901; see also FLA. STAT. § 409.175(1)(b). 
50. Sanders, 118 So. 3d at 901; see also FLA. STAT. § 409.175(1)(b). 
51. FLA. STAT. § 39.621(9). 
52. Id. 
53. 118 So. 3d 998 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam). 
54. Id. at 998. 
55. Id. 
5
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deciding the motion for reunification in the record.56  For these simple reasons, 
the appellate court upheld the decision below.57 
III. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 
The issue of the failure of parents to appear at termination of parental 
rights proceedings has come up in appellate court on numerous occasions in 
Florida.58  Under Florida law, it is possible for a court to enter a consent to the 
termination of parental rights.59  However, while the Florida statute governing 
the failure to appear may be grounds for termination of parental rights,60 the 
question remains as to the circumstances underlying the failure to appear, 
including the possibility that the parent appeared on one of several days in the 
proceeding.61  In C.S. v. Department of Children & Families,62 the mother and 
father appealed from a judgment terminating their parental rights on the basis of 
the entry of a consent when they failed to appear.63  The appellate court 
affirmed, finding that the court did not rule solely on the basis of the failure to 
appear, but also on the facts of the case.64  The appellate court also noted that 
“[t]he trial court found the mother’s excuse for [not appearing] not to be 
credible.”65  However, there was a very strong dissent by Judge Warner.66  
Apparently, “the parents appeared on the first two days of the adjudicatory 
hearing and failed to appear on the third day, [which was] scheduled three 
months later.”67  Relying on case law holding that a consent should not be 
entered where a parent does not appear at part of the hearing, Judge Warner 
would have granted the appeal on that ground.68 
                                                 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 998–99. 
58. See J.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 9 So. 3d 34, 35 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. 
App. 2009); Michael J. Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law, 38 NOVA L. REV. 81, 86–87 (2013) 
[hereinafter Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law]; Michael J. Dale, 2012 Survey of Juvenile Law, 
37 NOVA L. REV. 333, 342–46 (2013) [hereinafter Dale, 2012 Survey of Juvenile Law]. 
59. FLA. STAT. § 39.801(3)(d) (2014); see also J.M., 9 So. 3d at 36. 
60. FLA. STAT. § 39.801(3)(d). 
61. See Nickerson v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 718 So. 2d 373, 373–74 (Fla. 
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998). 
62. 124 So. 3d 978 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam), review denied, 
135 So. 3d 286 (Fla. 2014). 
63. Id. at 979. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 980. 
66. Id. (Warner, J., dissenting). 
67. C.S., 124 So. 3d at 980 (Warner, J., dissenting). 
68. Id. 
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Florida provides for termination of parental rights on numerous 
grounds—abuse, neglect, and abandonment.69  Abandonment, as defined in the 
Florida Statutes, is a situation where the parent “has made no significant 
contribution to the child’s care and maintenance.”70  It includes a lack of 
frequent contact with the child where marginal efforts or token visits are not 
enough.71  In S.L. v. Department of Children and Families,72 a mother appealed 
from an adjudication terminating her parental rights on grounds of continuing 
abuse, neglect, or abandonment.73  The appellate court affirmed in part and 
reversed in part, finding that the trial court erred in basing the termination on 
abandonment.74  Looking at the facts, the appellate court held that the mother 
had at least twenty-six visits over a one-year period with her children, and that 
record contained “testimony indicat[ing] there may have been other visits . . . 
not memorialized in . . . Department records.”75  There was also evidence of 
telephone communications and provision of clothing, shoes, snacks, food, and 
other gifts.76  In a second case, J.E. v. Department of Children and Families,77 
the appellate court affirmed a finding of abandonment by the father by clear and 
convincing evidence.78  The court found that he failed to demonstrate financial 
ability to support the children or the capacity to do so, having last paid support 
three months prior to the trial.79  In addition, his visitation was infrequent and 
irregular, causing the child not to see her father as a parent.80  Finally, the court 
affirmed because the parent failed to substantially comply with the case plan, a 
separate ground for termination of parental rights.81  The problem with the 
Florida Statute, as evidenced by the two cases described above, is that the 
language in the law is imprecise, containing no timeframes or other specific 
elements in the test of abandonment.82 
Termination of parental rights in Florida, as in other jurisdictions, 
requires first, a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds for 
                                                 
69. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(e)(1) (2014). 
70. Id. § 39.01(1). 
71. Id. 
72. 120 So. 3d 75 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam). 
73. Id. at 76. 
74. Id. at 77. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. 126 So. 3d 424 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
78. Id. at 428. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 430; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(e)(1) (2014). 
82. See FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(e); S.L. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 120 So. 
3d 75, 77 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam); J.E., 126 So. 3d at 428. 
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termination exist83 and second, that termination is in the manifest best interests 
of the child.84  Third, in Florida, termination must be the least restrictive 
alternative.85  In the case K.D. v. Department of Children & Family Services (In 
re Z.C. II),86 parents appealed a final judgment terminating parental rights to 
twin sons.87  The case had previously been on appeal.88  In the first decision, the 
appellate court held that since the trial court elected not to terminate parental 
rights, it could not immediately place the children in a permanent 
guardianship.89  Thus, the case went back to the trial court on questions of the 
least alternative means and manifest best interest.90  What brought the case back 
to the appellate court was the question of whether the trial court was obligated 
to consider new circumstances in determining whether termination was in the 
best interest of the children.91  Reviewing the facts of the case, the appellate 
court reversed and remanded again, finding that it could not say for certain that 
the trial court would not have decided that the circumstances warranted an 
adjudication of dependency instead of termination of parental rights as a matter 
of best interests of the child.92 
Finally, in A.J. v. Department of Children & Families,93 the appellate 
court reversed as to the failure of the trial court to make proper findings as to 
the grounds for termination of parental rights.94  Specifically, the appellate court 
found that there was no substantial evidence of significant harm to the sons, and 
was further “troubled by the court’s finding[] that the parents could not provide 
the children with necessities, [as] [t]here was no testimony establishing the 
parents’ financial situation and . . . no evidence that [they] could not . . . provide 
for their children.”95  In fact, the trial court denied the mother’s attorney the 
right to shed light on another issue—the children’s referral to therapy by their 
mother—on grounds that the question was irrelevant.96  The trial court further 
                                                 
83. FLA. STAT. § 39.809(1); see, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(1)(D)(f) (2014). 
84. FLA. STAT. § 39.810; see, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(1)(D)(m-1). 
85. Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla. 
1991); K.D. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. (In re Z.C. II), 132 So. 3d 877, 879 (Fla. 2d 
Dist. Ct. App. 2014); see also FLA. STAT. § 39.6012(3)(d). 
86. 132 So. 3d 877 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
87. Id. at 878. 
88. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. v. K.D. (In re Z.C. I), 88 So. 3d 977, 979 
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (en banc). 
89. Id. at 988–89. 
90. Id. at 989. 
91. In re Z.C. II, 132 So. 3d at 879. 
92. Id. at 879–80. 
93. 126 So. 3d 1212 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam).  This was a 2012 
case that was reported in 2013. 
94. Id. at 1215. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 1214. 
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compounded its errors by relying on “hearsay accounts regarding one of the 
young[] boys and one of the father’s daughters acting out sexually.”97 
IV. STATUS OFFENSES—CHILDREN IN NEED OF SERVICES 
Chapter 984, entitled “Children and Families in Need of Services,” 
deals with status offenders.98  A “child in need of services” concerns children 
who have committed an act, which if committed by an adult would not be a 
crime.99  Under Florida law, this includes children who persistently run away, 
are “habitually truant from school,” and who “persistently disobey[] the 
reasonable and lawful demands of [their] parents.”100  This statute begins with 
the following statement of purpose: 
To provide judicial and other procedures to assure due 
process through which children and other interested parties are 
assured fair hearings by a respectful and respected court or other 
tribunal[s] and the recognition, protection, and enforcement of their 
constitutional and other legal rights, while ensuring that public safety 
interests and the authority and dignity of the courts are adequately 
protected.101 
It appears clear from the Second District Court of Appeal ruling in 
Moyers v. State102 that the trial court failed to comply with the enabling 
language of the statute.103  In that case, a father “appeal[ed] two orders finding 
him in indirect criminal contempt for failing to comply with truancy orders” that 
obligated him to ensure that his daughter attended school.104  According to the 
appellate court, there was no evidence presented at the first of two hearings 
regarding an order to show cause, and that the evidence presented at the second 
hearing showed only that the father’s daughter had been absent or departed from 
school on several days.105  In fact, according to the appellate court, what the 
evidence did show was that the child’s medical condition caused her not to 
attend school for several days.106  There was no evidence of the father’s willful 
                                                 
97. Id. 
98. See FLA. STAT. § 984.01 (2014). 
99. See id. § 984.03(9). 
100. Id. § 984.03(9)(a)–(c). 
101. Id. § 984.01(1)(a). 
102. 127 So. 3d 827 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
103. Id. at 828; see also FLA. STAT. § 984.01(1)(a). 
104. Moyers, 127 So. 3d at 827–28. 
105. Id. at 828. 
106. Id. 
9
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failure to assure the child’s attendance.107  Rather, according to the appellate 
court, “[t]he truancy . . . judge improperly acted as the judge and the prosecutor, 
and the evidence was insufficient to establish Mr. Moyers’ willful 
noncompliance with the truancy court’s order[].”108  Seeing “the truancy judge’s 
improper role in the proceedings as prosecut[or], and because” there was no 
evidence to support the finding, the appellate court reversed.109  In so doing, it 
recognized that it had previously ruled in exactly the same fashion in a prior 
case involving the same trial judge.110 
An important question of the proximity of the status offense to a 
delinquency offense arose recently in M.J. v. State.111  In that case, a juvenile 
appealed from an adjudication of delinquency.112  The claim was that the trial 
court had denied the juvenile’s “motion to suppress his confession . . . from 
what [was] claim[ed] [to be] an illegal detention for loitering and prowling.”113  
Under the facts of the case, the court determined that the motion should have 
been suppressed because the reasonable stop of the juvenile by the police was 
for truancy, and thus, there was no “probable cause to arrest the juvenile for 
loitering and prowling.”114  According to the appellate court, during mid-day 
hours, a deputy sheriff noticed a juvenile “in front of a house in a high crime 
area.”115  The officer knew from prior dealings that the juvenile should have 
been in school.116  When the officer made a U-turn in his vehicle, the juvenile 
ran away, and the officer subsequently found the juvenile “lying along the 
concrete wall inside the porch” of the house.117  The officer then read the 
juvenile his Miranda rights and subsequently the juvenile confessed to a 
burglary.118  The appeals court found that the police officer saw the juvenile and 
“suspected him of being a truant, not . . . committing a crime.”119  Thus, there 
was no probable cause for the arrest for loitering and prowling.120 
                                                 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Moyers, 127 So. 3d at 828. 
110. Id. (referencing Sockwell v. State, 123 So. 3d 585, 592 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 
2012)). 
111. 121 So. 3d 1151, 1153 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013), review denied, 133 So. 
3d 528 (Fla. 2014). 
112. Id. at 1153. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. M.J., 121 So. 3d at 1153. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 1155. 
120. Id. 
10
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V. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 
The issue before the Supreme Court of Florida during this survey year 
was the question of proper interpretation of the speedy trial rule in delinquency 
cases.121  The specific issue in State v. S.A.122 was how to compute what is 
referred to as the speedy trial rule’s recapture window.123  The issue arose from 
a conflict in two of the district courts of appeal.124  In S.A., the appellate issue 
arose when the juvenile “filed a notice of expiration of speedy trial and a motion 
seeking discharge under the speedy trial rule.”125  The motion required 
application of the trial rule’s recapture window found in the Florida Rules of 
Juvenile Procedure.126  The recapture rule says that “[n]o later than [five] days 
from the date of the filing of [the] motion for discharge, the court [is obligated 
to] hold a hearing on the motion.”127  Then, “unless the court finds that one of 
the reasons set forth in subdivision (d) [of the rule] exists . . . the respondent 
[must] be brought to trial within [ten] days” and if not, and “through no fault of 
the respondent, the respondent [is] . . . discharged.”128  The specific technical 
question was whether the rule provides for one fifteen-day time period based 
upon the five- and ten-day provisions, or whether the calculation of the 
recapture window is based upon two separate, but interrelated time periods of 
five and ten days.129  Analyzing the legislative history—and over a dissent and 
two concurrences—the plurality ruling was “that the recapture window is 
comprised of two separate time periods.”130 
The Supreme Court of the United States’ rulings in Miller v. Alabama131 
and Graham v. Florida132 have generated a growing body of interpretive case 
law in Florida and in other jurisdictions.133  In Mason v. State,134 the specific 
question the appellate court dealt with was if the application of Miller, which 
                                                 
121. See State v. S.A., 133 So. 3d 506, 507 (Fla. 2014) (per curiam). 
122. 133 So. 3d 506 (Fla. 2014) (per curiam). 
123. Id. at 507. 
124. Id.; see also State v. S.A., 96 So. 3d 1133, 1135 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2012), reh’g granted, 2013 Fla. Lexis 881 (Fla. 2013), quashed, 133 So. 3d 506 (Fla. 2014); State 
v. McFarland, 747 So. 2d 481, 483 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
125. S.A., 133 So. 3d at 507. 
126. FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.090(m)(3); S.A., 133 So. 3d at 507–08. 
127. FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.090(m)(3); S.A., 133 So. 3d at 508. 
128. FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.090(m)(3). 
129. S.A., 133 So. 3d at 509. 
130. Id. 
131. No. 10-9646, slip op. (U.S. June 25, 2012). 
132. 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
133. See Miller, No. 10-9646, slip op. at 2; Graham, 560 U.S. at 82; 1 MICHAEL J. 
DALE ET AL., REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT ¶ 5.03(13)(e)(iii) (2014). 
134. 134 So. 3d 499 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (per curiam). 
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had held that a sentencing law “requir[ing] a mandatory sentence of life in 
prison without . . . parole for a juvenile, [was violative of] the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.”135  In the 
Mason case, the juvenile “negotiated [a] plea to second-degree murder . . . and 
received life in prison with a fifteen-year mandatory minimum as a [violent 
habitual] felony offender.”136  Because the statute under which the juvenile was 
punished did not contain a requirement of mandatory life in prison without 
parole, Miller did not apply, according to the appellate court.137  Although the 
court employed discretion at the trial level to impose a higher sentence than it 
could have, nothing indicated that the court did not take Mason’s youth into 
account when determining the sentence.138  The appellate court thus affirmed.139 
In Weiand v. State,140 the juvenile appealed an order denying his motion 
for post-conviction relief.141  Based upon the defendant’s pro se appeal, the 
intermediate appellate court held that the sentence of life in prison without 
parole on kidnapping and robbery convictions was illegal under Graham v. 
State.142  Applying Graham, the appellate court held that “the Supreme Court 
[of the United States] created a bright-line rule . . . that a defendant . . . under 
eighteen, when” he or she commits a “non-homicide offense [could not] be 
sentenced to life without parole.”143 
Lack of probable cause for an arrest of a juvenile for loitering, 
described in the M.J. case above, has arisen on several occasions in the 
appellate courts.144  Thus, in C.C. v. State,145 a juvenile “was adjudicated 
delinquent on charge[s] of loitering and prowling,” appealed the adjudication, 
and the appellate court reversed, finding there was a failure to establish a 
completed offense of loitering and prowling.146  The case arose when police 
officers in the City of Hollywood at about ten o’clock in the morning noticed a 
                                                 
135. Id. at 500; see also Miller, No. 10-9646, slip op. at 2; DALE ET AL., supra note 
133, at ¶ 5.03(13)(e)(iii). 
136. See Mason, 134 So. 3d at 500. 
137. Id.; see also Miller, No. 10-9646, slip op. at 2. 
138. See Mason, 134 So. 3d at 501. 
139. Id. 
140. 129 So. 3d 434 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
141. Id. at 434. 
142. Id. at 435; see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010). 
143. Weiand, 129 So. 3d at 435 (emphasis added); see also Graham, 560 U.S. at 
82. 
144. See C.C. v. State, 137 So. 3d 466, 467 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review 
denied, No. SC14-960, 2014 WL 4291798 (Fla. Aug. 29, 2014); M.J. v. State, 121 So. 3d 1151, 
1153 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013), review denied, 133 So. 3d 528 (Fla. 2014); supra text 
accompanying notes 111–20. 
145. 137 So. 3d 466 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, No. SC14-960, 2014 
WL 4291798 (Fla. Aug. 29, 2014). 
146. Id. at 467. 
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juvenile who the officers believed should have been in school.147  “When the 
officers stopped their patrol car [the respondent] and two other[s] . . . dropped 
their backpacks in a bush and [tried to hide] behind a truck.”148  The officers 
arrested the respondent, searched his backpack, and found a four-way lug 
wrench and other tools.149  At trial, respondent moved to dismiss, which was 
denied, and the defense then rested.150  The appellate court held “that the items 
found . . . after [the] arrest should not have been admitted [as evidence] or 
considered by the trial court because the offense of loitering and prowling [was 
not] completed.”151  In fact, the appellate court held that, under the law, it must 
be found that the respondent was loitering and prowling at a place and in a 
manner not usual for law-abiding citizens, that loitering was under 
circumstances that warranted alarm or concern for the safety of others, and that 
these elements were completed prior to the arrest.152  Significantly, the appellate 
court held that it was unable to distinguish the C.C. case from M.J.153  
Recognizing the nearly identical facts, the court held that the State had failed to 
prove that the elements of the offense occurred in the officers’ presence.154  It 
thus reversed.155 
In a third similar case, G.T. v. State,156 the juvenile appealed from a 
conviction “for resisting an officer without violence when she refused to 
[provide] the arresting officer [with] her name and personal information after 
[she was] detained [on] suspicion of underage drinking and disorderly 
intoxication.”157  In order to detain someone, the “officer must have reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity by” that individual.158  In this case, the State was 
unable to demonstrate the facts that connected the child to an empty liquor 
bottle or to show that the police officer “had more than an inchoate hunch that 
this group of juveniles was the one [that] he had been dispatched to 
investigate.”159  The only information that the officer had was that the juveniles 
appeared to have “red [and] glossy eyes and slurred speech, [suggesting] to the 
                                                 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. C.C., 137 So. 3d at 467. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 468–69 (quoting E.F. v. State, 110 So. 3d 101, 104 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. 
App.), review denied, 121 So. 3d 1038 (Fla. 2013)). 
153. Id. at 468; see also M.J. v. State, 121 So. 3d 1151, 1153 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. 
App. 2013), review denied, 133 So. 3d 528 (Fla. 2014). 
154. C.C., 137 So. 3d at 469. 
155. Id. at 469–70. 
156. 120 So. 3d 141 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam). 
157. Id. at 142. 
158. Id. at 143. 
159. Id. 
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officer that they were intoxicated.”160  However, the officer observed this after 
he detained the juvenile.161  The court thus reversed.162 
The fourth lack of reasonable suspicion case is A.R. v. State.163  In this 
case, the act of delinquency alleged was resisting an officer without violence.164 
 “Boynton Beach police were ‘investigating a . . . crime that [may have] taken 
place’ in a public park.”165  When officers arrived, the appellant turned away 
and started to run.166  The officer yelled at the individual to stop a number of 
times, and the youth ultimately gave up and surrendered.167  The juvenile’s 
argument on appeal was that the police investigation of the crime could not be 
the basis to legally detain a person where there was no reasonable suspicion of 
probable cause as to that individual.168  Running away—the court held based on 
prior case law—“is not sufficient to establish [a] reasonable suspicion where 
there is no evidence to demonstrate that the flight took place in a high crime 
area.”169  Further, there was no showing that the flight obstructed the officers in 
the lawful execution of their duties.170  The court thus reversed.171 
Issues of detention, ranging from home detention through secure 
detention, appear regularly in the appellate case law.172  The issue in H.D. v. 
Shore173 was whether a child could be held in secure detention based upon a 
prior arrest for burglary of a dwelling and grand theft offenses, which by 
themselves did not score sufficiently on Florida’s Risk Assessment Instrument 
(“RAI”) for secure detention, but when the juvenile failed to go to school, the 
father reported the violation and the court then ordered secure detention.174  The 
appellate court ruled that Florida’s juvenile detention statute does not provide a 
court with the authority to order secure detention solely on the basis of a 
violation of a pre-adjudication home detention.175  The appellate court then 
explained that the remedy for such a violation was indirect contempt.176  
                                                 
160. Id. 
161. G.T., 120 So. 3d at 143. 
162. Id. at 143–44. 
163. 127 So. 3d 650, 652 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 652–53. 
168. A.R., 127 So. 3d at 653. 
169. Id. at 654. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at 655. 
172. Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 58, at 93; see, e.g., H.D. v. 
Shore, 134 So. 3d 1062, 1062 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam). 
173. 134 So. 3d 1062 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam). 
174. Id. at 1062–63. 
175. Id. at 1063; see also FLA. STAT. § 985.255 (2014). 
176. H.D., 134 So. 3d at 1063. 
14
Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 2
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss1/2
2014] 2014 SURVEY OF JUVENILE LAW 51 
Therefore, the appellate court held that as the child did not score enough points 
under Florida’s RAI for secure detention, and there were no findings to depart 
from the RAI, secure detention was improper.177  The court thus granted the writ 
of habeas corpus.178  It should be noted that the court in H.D. disagreed with the 
court in K.T.E. v. Lofthiem,179 that section 985.265(1) of the Florida Statutes 
“provides an independent basis for ordering secure detention” under the facts in 
the H.D. case.180 
Evidentiary issues are not usually part of this juvenile survey as they 
are generic to any variety of litigation settings.181  However, a recent Fourth 
District Court of Appeal case, T.D.W. v. State182 is worthy of discussion as it 
deals with best evidence.183  The issue before the court was “whether [the] 
appellant was [properly] identified as one of the three boys who burgl[arized] a 
home.”184  His “identification was based in part on the [detective’s] 
testimony.”185  The detective testified that “she saw [the appellant] on a 
surveillance videotape [that] she [had] viewed outside the courtroom.”186  
However, the “identification did not appear on the copy of the surveillance 
video offered into evidence at trial.”187  Florida Rule of Evidence 90.952 
provides in relevant part that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, an 
original writing, recording, or photograph is required in order to prove the 
contents of the writing, recording, or photograph.”188  Known as the Best 
Evidence Rule, unless an exception may be shown, “‘the testimony of [the] 
witness . . . [regarding] the contents of the original is inadmissible.’”189  Finding 
that the error was not harmless, citing similar case law, the appellate court 
reversed.190 
The issue of whether Second Amendment constitutional rights apply to 
juveniles was before the Fourth District Court of Appeal in L.S. v. State.191  A 
                                                 
177. Id. at 1064. 
178. Id. at 1062, 1064. 
179. 915 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
180. H.D., 134 So. 3d. at 1063–64; see also FLA. STAT. § 985.265(1); K.T.E., 915 
So. 2d at 769–70. 
181. See Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 58, at 84. 
182. 137 So. 3d 574 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
183. Id. at 575. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. T.D.W., 137 So. 3d at 575. 
188. FLA. STAT. § 90.952 (2014). 
189. T.D.W., 137 So. 3d at 576; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.952. 
190. T.D.W., 137 So. 3d at 577–78; see also McKeehan v. State, 838 So. 2d 1257, 
1261 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
191. 120 So. 3d 55, 58 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
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juvenile was adjudicated delinquent based upon “carrying a concealed firearm, 
grand theft of a firearm, improper exhibition of a firearm, [and] resisting arrest 
without violence [as well as] possession of a firearm by a minor.”192  The 
appellate court reversed as to all adjudications with the exception of carrying a 
concealed firearm.193  As to that adjudication, the minor argued that he had a 
right under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution to carry 
the firearm as there is no juvenile exception in the Amendment.194  The 
appellate court held that the constitutional rights of children are not equated 
with those of adults on the basis of the juvenile’s “inability to make decisions in 
an informed and mature manner.”195  Citing basic United States Constitutional 
law, the court held that while the Second Amendment does not mention 
juveniles, the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized limitations on 
the right to bear arms.196  The court also commented that the constitutional 
rights of children under the Florida Constitution are not the same as adults, as 
well as under the laws of other states.197  The court therefore affirmed the 
adjudication of possession of firearms by a minor.198 
Florida provides that incompetency may be grounds under which a 
proceeding to determine delinquency may not proceed and that ultimately the 
charges under certain circumstances may be dismissed.199  The basis for 
incompetence may be age, immaturity, a mental illness, intellectual disability, 
or autism.200  The question before the Fourth District Court of Appeal in D.B. v. 
State,201 was whether dismissal of a delinquency petition was mandated as the 
juvenile had been declared incompetent more than three years earlier and 
remained incompetent.202  Under the Florida Statutes, and pursuant to due 
process principles, a juvenile may not be tried while incompetent.203  The 
statutes also provide a jurisdictional limit on how long the court may retain 
jurisdiction.204   Here, under the statute and as conceded by the State, dismissal 
was warranted.205 
                                                 
192. Id. at 56. 
193. Id. at 59. 
194. Id. at 58; see also U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
195. L.S., 120 So. 3d at 58. 
196. U.S. CONST. amend. II.; but see In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla.), 
withdrawn, 1989 Lexis 1226 (Fla. 1989). 
197. L.S., 120 So. 3d at 59. 
198. Id. 
199. FLA. STAT. § 985.19(1), (5)(c) (2014). 
200. See id. § 985.19(2), (3)(a). 
201. 120 So. 3d 71 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
202. Id. at 72. 
203. Id. at 73; see also FLA. STAT. § 985.19(1). 
204. FLA. STAT. § 985.19(5)(c). 
205. D.B., 120 So. 3d at 72. 
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The issue of waiver of Miranda rights by juveniles is a very common 
issue that arises in the appellate courts all over the country.206  That issue was 
before the appellate court in J.X. v. State.207  In that case, a juvenile appealed the 
denial of his motion to suppress statements he provided to the police after being 
given his Miranda warnings, which he then waived.208  The juvenile was 
seventeen and was summoned to the police station with his mother.209  There 
was a suspicion that he had been involved in burglaries.210  As soon as he was 
advised that he had been asked to come to the police station because of the two 
residential burglaries, he unequivocally invoked his right to counsel.211  The 
police officer “closed his case file and terminated the interview.”212  However, 
after the detective said he was going to speak to the juvenile’s brother, the 
mother encouraged the appellant to cooperate.213  After the juvenile reinitiated 
contact with the officer, the officer advised the juvenile again of his Miranda 
rights, giving him the form containing the full recitation and orally advising 
him.214  The juvenile then confessed.215  The appellate court held that when the 
juvenile reinstituted contact with the police—where there was no threat of 
coercion and where the juvenile did not ask for a lawyer—the waiver was free, 
voluntary, and knowing.216  It then affirmed the denial of the motion to 
suppress.217 
Florida’s delinquency statute provides a number of dispositional 
alternatives including probation, restitution, community service, revocation of 
driver’s licenses, and attendance at school.218  Restitution issues often come up 
before the appellate courts on proper application of the Florida Statute.219  In 
T.J.J. v. State,220 a juvenile appealed an order of disposition—including 
restitution—after he admitted to a burglary of a dwelling.221  The issue was that 
the restitution order included a payment for “items not listed in the original 
                                                 
206. E.g., J.X. v. State, 125 So. 3d 364, 365 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2013); see also 
DALE ET AL., supra note 133, at ¶ 5.03(7). 
207. 125 So. 3d 364, 365 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
208. Id. at 365. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
212. J.X., 125 So. 3d at 365. 
213. Id. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. at 367. 
217. J.X., 125 So. 3d at 367. 
218. FLA. STAT. § 985.455(1)–(2) (2014). 
219. Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 58, at 94. 
220. 121 So. 3d 635 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
221. Id. at 637. 
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charging document.”222  The amount of restitution was “$2718, or more than 
twice what the charging document,” set forth.223  The appeals court reversed for 
failure to comply with the statute, which provides that restitution is based upon 
the charging document.224 
In V.A.C. v. State,225 the issue involving an order of restitution dealt 
with a jurisdictional problem.226  In that case, the juvenile turned nineteen, and a 
notice of hearing to establish restitution was filed after the juvenile’s nineteenth 
birthday.227  As a result, the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction.228  Having 
reserved jurisdiction on the issue of restitution prior to the juvenile’s nineteenth 
birthday, the trial court could have dealt with the matter.229  However, the “court 
erred in ordering restitution after it lost jurisdiction.”230 
If there is an allegation that a juvenile has violated probation, under 
Florida law, the state may file a petition for violation of probation.231  In S.M. v. 
State,232 the juvenile appealed the dispositional order which found her guilty of 
violation of probation on the grounds that the juvenile had been ordered to leave 
the courtroom to privately speak to her grandmother, and because the State 
presented only hearsay evidence by the juvenile’s probation officer to support 
the allegation.233  The appellate court held that “[w]hile ‘[h]earsay is admissible 
in a revocation hearing,’” it cannot be the sole basis for the finding; in the case 
at bar that was all the evidence.234  Thus, “there was insufficient evidence to 
revoke the . . . probation on the two allegations contained [in] the petition.”235  
Furthermore, “juveniles have a constitutional right to be present at all critical 
stages of the proceeding[],” unless waived by the child himself or herself.236  
Because “the juvenile did not personally waive her right to be present” and 
because events took place while the juvenile was out of the courtroom—only to 
be back to hear the disposition—the court also reversed.237 
                                                 
222. Id. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. 
225. 136 So. 3d 612 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
226. Id. at 613. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. 
230. V.A.C., 136 So. 3d at 614. 
231. FLA. STAT. § 985.439(1)(b) (2014). 
232. 138 So. 3d 1156 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
233. Id. at 1157, 1159. 
234. Id. at 1159 (quoting McNealy v. State, 479 So. 2d 138, 139 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. 
App. 1985)). 
235. Id. 
236. Id. at 1159–60 (quoting J.R. v. State, 953 So. 2d 690, 691 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. 
App. 2007) (per curiam)). 
237. S.M., 138 So. 3d at 1160. 
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Another dispositional issue that comes up on occasion is the question of 
the specifics of special conditions of juvenile probation.238  In T.J.J., in addition 
to ordering “restitution for items not [contained] in the . . . charging document, 
[t]he [trial] court also imposed [as] a special condition of . . . probation that the 
[respondent] not associate with persons under supervision, members of gangs, 
or whose contact [was] prohibited by the juvenile’s probation officer, parent or 
guardian.”239  The appellate court reversed as to this condition of probation 
finding that nothing in the Florida Statutes or the Rules of Juvenile Procedure 
contained a “blanket prohibition of willful contact” with certain individuals.240  
The rules’ “special condition [dealt with] prohibiting contact with the 
victim[s].”241  Furthermore, the appellate court held that “the condition must be 
related to the crime committed.”242  Finally, the appellate court held that “the 
condition [was] invalid for vagueness and overbreadth.”243 
Another example of police interaction with a juvenile during school 
hours and their handling of them is R.A.S. v. State.244  In that case, a juvenile 
appealed from a delinquency adjudication for “possession of marijuana and 
drug paraphernalia” having unsuccessfully sought to suppress the evidence.245  
A police officer was driving through the respondent’s neighborhood trying to 
find him because the youngster had been reported absent from school.246  When 
“[t]he deputy located [the student] and asked him to come over to talk to him,” 
the student said he was on his way to school.247  The deputy offered to give the 
student a ride to school, which the student accepted.248  The deputy then told the 
youngster to empty his pockets, indicating that he was doing a weapons pat-
down.249  In so doing, the officer—realizing the student failed to entirely empty 
his pockets—felt an item, which turned out to be a plastic bag of marijuana.250  
The appellate court held that ordering someone to empty his pockets under these 
circumstances was an unauthorized full search.251  “The deputy did not have . . . 
                                                 
238. T.J.J. v. State, 121 So. 3d 635, 637 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013); see also 
FLA. STAT. § 985.435 (2014). 
239. T.J.J., 121 So. 3d at 637. 
240. Id. at 638–39; see also FLA. STAT. § 985.435; FLA. R. JUV. P. Form 8.947. 
241. T.J.J., 121 So. 3d at 638; see also FLA. R. JUV. P. Form 8.947. 
242. T.J.J., 121 So. 3d at 638 (citing Biller v. State, 618 So. 2d 734, 734–35 (Fla. 
1993)). 
243. Id. 
244. 141 So. 3d 687, 689 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
245. Id. 
246. Id. 
247. Id. 
248. Id. 
249. R.A.S., 141 So. 3d at 689. 
250. Id. 
251. Id. 
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reason to [believe] that [the youngster] was carrying a weapon or contraband.  
Thus, the initial search had no legal basis.”252  The court recognized that the 
police officer did have the right to conduct the pat-down for weapons.253  But 
when an officer takes a truant into custody, as here, “the only concern is for 
officer safety,” which means the concern is about a weapon.254  Thus, the 
appellate court reversed.255 
Florida law provides a form of amnesty or immunity for school students 
who divulge information related to the supplying of controlled substances if the 
events giving rise to the incident “occurred on property other than public school 
property.”256  In State v. E.M.,257 the State appealed the trial court’s granting of 
the respondent juvenile’s motion in limine to preclude statements to school 
officials.258  The case arose out of an internal suspension resulting from a 
violation of the school dress code.259  The student told the school security 
officials that he was out of dress code because “his uniform shirt was ‘messed 
up.’”260  When the security officer asked the youngster to show the officer the 
shirt and when the juvenile “opened his backpack to take out [his] shirt, [the] 
[s]ecurity [officials] smelled the odor of marijuana.”261  As a result, the juvenile 
admitted that he had the marijuana, which the security officer found in the 
backpack.262  The State alleged two counts—possession of marijuana with intent 
to deliver at the nearest school and marijuana subsequently found in the 
juvenile’s home.263  As a matter of statutory interpretation, the appellate court 
held that the immunity statute did not apply because the student did not fall 
within the category of one who “divulges information leading to the arrest and 
conviction of the person who supplied the controlled substance to him.”264  
Rather, the student fell into the second category which did not receive the same 
protection—which is to say inadmissibly of incriminating statements—as in the 
first category.265  The appellate court therefore reversed.266 
                                                 
252. Id. 
253. Id. at 690. 
254. R.A.S., 141 So. 3d at 690. 
255. Id. 
256. FLA. STAT. § 1006.09(2)(a) (2014). 
257. 141 So. 3d 682 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
258. Id. at 683. 
259. Id. 
260. Id. 
261. Id. 
262. E.M., 141 So. 3d at 683. 
263. Id. 
264. Id. at 685 (citing FLA. STAT. § 1006.09(2)(a)(2014)). 
265. Id. 
266. Id. at 686. 
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VI. OTHER MATTERS 
The role of Florida’s well-funded GAL Program has been discussed in 
this law review on several occasions.267  In Turnier v. Stockman,268 the issue of 
whether a guardian ad litem could be appointed arose in the context of a chapter 
61 custody matter commenced as a paternity proceeding.269  The case 
transferred from St. Johns County to Miami-Dade County, involved with whom 
a deaf minor child should live, where both of the parents were deaf.270  The trial 
court considered appointing a GAL, but ultimately did not.271  The mother 
appealed, arguing that it was reversible error for the trial court to fail to appoint 
a GAL for the child.272  The appellate court held that there was no requirement 
to appoint a guardian in the proceeding below because the Florida Legislature 
in, chapter 61, did not make the appointment mandatory, but rather 
discretionary.273 
The question of liability of what are known in Florida as the lead 
agencies—the organizations to which the Department of Children and Families 
outsource the provision of foster care and related services—was before the First 
District Court of Appeal.274  The case—a wrongful death action arising out of 
the death of a child in foster care—was brought against Partnership for Strong 
Families, the community-based provider in several counties in the state.275  The 
appellate court affirmed summary judgment for the provider, finding it owed no 
duty to the child because the trial court had terminated protective supervision, 
and thus the “negligence could not be the proximate cause of” the child’s 
death.276  The death had occurred as a result of the action of the child’s father to 
whom the child had been returned.277  Finding that the alleged negligence was 
also unforeseeable, the appellate court affirmed the grant of the motion for 
summary judgment.278  Thus, Castello v. Partnership for Strong Families, 
                                                 
267. See, e.g., Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 323–32. 
268. 139 So. 3d 397 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014),. 
269. Id. at 398–400; see also FLA. STAT. § 61.401 (2014). 
270. Turnier, 139 So. 3d at 398. 
271. Id. at 399. 
272. Id. at 400. 
273. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 61.401. 
274. Castello v. P’ship for Strong Families, Inc., 117 So. 3d 62, 63–64 (Fla. 1st 
Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam), review denied, 139 So. 3d 884 (Fla. 2014); see also FLA. STAT. 
§ 39.0016(1)(b). 
275. Castello, 117 So. 3d at 63. 
276. Id. at 63–64. 
277. Id. at 63. 
278. Id. at 63–64. 
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Inc.279 mirrors the Supreme Court of the United States ruling in DeShaney v. 
Winnebago County Department of Social Services.280 
Domestic violence matters unrelated to dependency proceedings can 
also involve juveniles.281  Cannon v. Thomas282 is such a case.283  A student 
appealed from a trial court order “granting a permanent injunction for protection 
against repeat violence” arising out of the appellant child’s attack upon the 
appellee child.284  The injunction was granted based upon a factual 
determination that the appellant “brutally battered [a]ppellee’s daughter, 
slamming her head against a concrete wall” near a convenience store.285  The 
problem, according to the appellate court, is that the Florida statute requires two 
incidents of violence in order to protect the minor child.286  Thus, while 
recognizing the severity of the attack, as a matter of statutory construction, the 
appellate court was obligated to vacate the injunction for protection against the 
violence.287 
VII. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES 
This year’s legislative changes in juvenile law demonstrate a new 
emphasis on prevention and intervention,288 a commitment to utilizing trauma 
informed care,289 and revised standards for detention centers.290  The Legislature 
also increased protections for juvenile offenders by adding criminal penalties 
for willful neglect on the part of Department of Juvenile Justice (“DJJ”) 
employees.291  In dependency, the Legislature addressed a longstanding issue 
relating to termination of parental rights for prospective child abuse, reversing 
twenty years of case law that required a nexus between prior abuse and current 
risk.292  The Legislature has also created a right to counsel for special needs 
children in dependency actions.293  Other changes include new provisions for 
                                                 
279. 117 So. 3d 62 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam), review denied, 139 
So. 3d 884 (Fla. 2014). 
280. 489 U.S. 189, 203 (1989); Castello, 117 So. 3d at 64. 
281. See FLA. STAT. § 784.046(2)(a) (2014). 
282. 133 So. 3d 634 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
283. Id. at 635. 
284. Id. 
285. Id. 
286. FLA. STAT. § 784.046(1)(b); Cannon, 133 So. 3d at 635, 640. 
287. Cannon, 133 So. 3d at 635, 640. 
288. FLA. STAT. § 985.01(1)(a). 
289. Id. §§ 985.02(8), .03(52). 
290. Id. §§ 985.02(5), .03(44). 
291. Id. § 985.702(2)(a). 
292. See id. § 39.806(1)(f); Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 
So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla. 1991). 
293. FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(3). 
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addressing cases of medical neglect,294 and new provisions for reporting and 
addressing deaths of children in department care.295  The Legislature also 
extended the scope of the relative caregiver program to include non-relative 
caregivers.296  On a lighter note, the Legislature has mandated a program to help 
children in department care obtain their driver’s licenses.297 
A. Juvenile Delinquency Statutory Changes 
This year, the Legislature has introduced a shift in the declared purpose 
of the juvenile justice system by emphasizing the role of prevention, 
intervention, treatment, and the importance of children’s families and 
community support systems.298  To this end, the Legislature added section 
985.17 of the Florida Statutes, describing the need for prevention services to 
“decrease recidivism by addressing the needs of at-risk youth and their 
families.”299  The new statute directs the DJJ to “develop the capacity for local 
communities to serve their youth [through] engag[ing] faith and community 
based organizations to provide” various volunteer services such as “chaplaincy 
services, crisis intervention counseling, mentoring, and tutoring.”300  The statute 
directs the DJJ to provide services such as literacy and recreation programs 
targeted specifically at certain at-risk youth.301 
The Legislature has also added an emphasis on trauma informed care 
recognizing the role that trauma, such as “violence, physical or sexual abuse, 
neglect, [and] medical difficulties,” plays in the child’s life.302  The DJJ is 
directed to provide services to “be more supportive and avoid retraumatization, 
[through] trauma-specific interventions that are designed . . . to facilitate 
healing.”303 
The shift toward prevention through family and community 
involvement is also apparent in new guidelines for detention facilities.304  
Facilities are to be placed close to the home communities of children they serve 
to encourage family involvement.305  Further evidencing the transition to more 
                                                 
294. Id. § 39.3068. 
295. Id. § 39.201(3). 
296. Id. § 39.5085(1)(a), (2)(a)(3). 
297. Id. § 409.1454(1)–(2). 
298. See FLA. STAT. § 985.01(1)(a), (e). 
299. Id. § 985.17(1). 
300. Id. § 985.17(2)–(2)(a). 
301. Id. § 985.17(3)(a). 
302. Id. § 985.03(52); see also FLA. STAT. §§ 985.02(8), .601(3)(a). 
303. FLA. STAT. § 985.02(8). 
304. Id. § 985.02(5). 
305. Id. § 985.02(5)(c). 
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individualized services is the reduction of the maximum number of beds 
allowed in facilities from 165 to 90.306 
Lastly, the Legislature has filled a significant gap in protection of 
juvenile offenders from harm at the hands of DJJ employees, volunteers, and 
interns.307  Although the Florida Statutes provided criminal penalties for sexual 
abuse of children within the juvenile justice system, there was no such provision 
for employees alleged to have neglected a youth in the department’s custody.308 
 Although such incidences are uncommon, one recent highly publicized event 
illustrated the need for legislative change.309  In 2011, an eighteen-year-old in 
the department’s custody died of a brain hemorrhage after “guards refused to 
call 911 for more than six hours” because they thought the young person was 
faking.310  Unfortunately, the guards could not be charged with child neglect 
because the person was eighteen and no longer legally a child.311  To address 
instances such as this, the Legislature amended section 985.701 of the Florida 
Statutes to define ‘“[j]uvenile offender’ [as a] person of any age . . . detained . . . 
or committed to the custody of the department,” and created section 985.702 
which makes “[w]illful and malicious neglect of a juvenile offender” a felony 
offense.312  In addition, violation of these provisions is grounds for dismissal 
and permanent disqualification from employment in the juvenile justice 
system.313  Section 985.702 also imposes a duty on DJJ employees to report 
instances of neglect and makes failure to do so a first-degree misdemeanor.314 
B. Dependency Statutory Changes 
Perhaps the most significant practical change in substantive dependency 
law was the legislative abrogation of the nexus test established by the Supreme 
Court of Florida in Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative 
Services315 in 1991.316  The Padgett nexus test—which has been applied for over 
                                                 
306. FLA. H.R., FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, CS/HB 7055, Reg. Leg. Sess., at 3 (Fla. 
2014); see also FLA. STAT. § 985.02(5)(c). 
307. FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, CS/HB 7055, at 17–18, see also FLA. STAT. § 985.702. 
308. FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, CS/HB 7055, at 17. 
309. Id.; Ana M. Valdes, Parents of Teen Who Died in Detention to Sue State, 
PALM BEACH POST, Mar. 14, 2012, at B1. 
310. Lisa Rab, DJJ Supervisor Thought Eric Perez Was “Faking” As He Died in 
Juvie Lockup, Officer Testifies, THE PULP (Mar. 9, 2012, 12:42 PM), http://
blogs.browardpalmbeach.com/pulp/2012/03/djj_eric_perez_death_grand_jury_report.php; see 
also Valdes, supra note 309. 
311. Rab, supra note 310; see also FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, CS/HB 7055, at 17. 
312. FLA. STAT. §§ 985.701(1)(a)(1)(c), .702(2)(a)–(b). 
313. Id. § 985.702(2)(c). 
314. Id. § 985.702(3), (4)(a)–(b). 
315. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991). 
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two decades317— mandated that termination of parental rights (“TPR”) based 
upon the abuse of sibling or another child in the family must be predicated upon 
a showing of a nexus between the harm to the other child, and imminent risk of 
harm to the current child.318  The Legislature has eliminated this nexus 
requirement in part, amending section 39.806 of the Florida Statutes to specify 
that no proof of a nexus between prior conduct and potential harm to a sibling is 
required in cases of prior egregious conduct, or those related to homicide of a 
child or the other parent.319  Similarly, conviction of crime “that requires [a] 
parent to register as a sexual predator” has been added as a grounds for TPR.320 
Although several organizations provide attorney representation to 
dependent children in some parts of the state on a limited basis, the Legislature 
has recognized that children with special needs have a particular need for legal 
representation.321  For this reason, the Legislature has extended a right to legal 
representation for dependent children with certain special needs.322  
Specifically, an attorney shall be provided for a child who is subject to any 
proceeding under chapter 39 who resides or is being considered for placement 
in a skilled nursing home or residential treatment center, is prescribed but 
declines assent to psychotropic medication, has a developmental disability, or is 
a victim of human trafficking.323 
There is a series of serious infirmities in the new statute.324  First, it 
leaves unrepresented many children with equally serious needs, as well as the 
vast majority of the over twenty-eight thousand children who are before the 
dependency court.325  There are several constitutional reasons why all these 
other children are entitled to counsel.326  The fact that they are treated 
                                                                                                                   
316. Id. at 57; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(f); Fla. Prof’l Staff of the Comm. 
On Appropriations, Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement, S. 1666, Reg. Sess., at 19 (2014). 
317. Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 58, at 85. 
318. Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 571; Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 
58, at 85. 
319. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(f), (h). 
320. Id. § 39.806(1)(n).  Research discloses no legislative history for these 
changes.  FLA. STAT. § 39.806 (2013). 
321. FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(1)(a)(2).  The legislation is a response to a 2012 
warning issued by the United States Department of Justice threatening a law suit against the State 
of Florida regarding Americans with Disabilities Act violations concerning severely disabled 
children housed in nursing homes throughout the state.  FLA. H.R., FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, CS/HB 
561, Reg. Leg. Sess., at 3 (2014). 
322. FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(3). 
323. Id. 
324. See id. § 39.01305(1)–(9). 
325. See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 311, 353; DCF Quick Facts, FLA. 
DEP’T OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, http://www.dcfstate.fl.us/general-information/quick-facts/cw 
(last visited Nov. 9, 2014). 
326. Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 350–53. 
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differently than those provided with lawyers raises a question of equal 
protection.327  The failure to provide counsel at all to most children in Florida in 
these cases may also be a denial of procedural due process.328 
Second, the new law appropriates five million dollars to pay for lawyers 
to represent the children.329  However, it says that, first, efforts must be made to 
find volunteer lawyers.330  This itself is a problem because volunteer lawyers 
have never been able to represent even a significant fraction of the children 
before the dependency court.331  The decision to provide lawyers for children is 
first made by the attorneys for the Department of Children and Families.332  The 
law thus creates an ethical issue for department lawyers.333  Pursuant to the 
Florida Rules of Professional Responsibility, the decision of whether a party 
should be entitled to counsel is being made by a lawyer for another party.334  
Moreover, the system for locating and training lawyers to represent children is 
left to the GAL Program.335  This creates a similar ethical problem.336  Thus, one 
party is training and choosing those lawyers who will represent another party.337 
Third, the legislature never explained why the excess of thirty million 
dollars that it has expended to fund the GAL Program every year is not adequate 
to represent these children.338  Of course—as discussed in two articles by this 
author in the Nova Law Review339—the first part of the answer may be that the 
                                                 
327. Id. 
328. Id. at 311, 353. 
329. FLA. H.R., FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, CS/HB 561, Reg. Leg. Sess., at 4 (2014). 
330. FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(4)(a) (2014). 
331. See U. FLA. LEVIN COLL. LAW CTR. ON CHILDREN & FAMILIES & FLA’S 
CHILDREN FIRST, LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF DEPENDENT CHILDREN 6 (2012).  The failure to fund 
volunteer lawyers to represent children is compounded by the influx of approximately 53,000 
undocumented children into the United States and the efforts of bar associations to fund lawyers 
for them.  Melvin Felix & Mike Clary, Deutsch Vows to Fight for Undocumented Kids, SUN 
SENTINEL (Dec. 18, 2014, 8:42 PM), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/politics/fl-
undocumented-minors-folo-20141218-story.html; Mara Gay, As Child Immigrants Await Fate, a 
Race for Counsel, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2014, at A19; Jan Pudlow, Florida Lawyers Stand with 
Unaccompanied Minors, FLA. B. NEWS, Oct. 1, 2014, at 1.  Legal Aid Societies are overwhelmed 
by need for pro bono lawyers to meet need of unaccompanied immigrant children.  Gay, supra 
note 331. 
332. FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(6); Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 308 n.10. 
333. Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 308 n.10, 352–53. 
334. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.14(b); see also Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 
15, at 311, 353. 
335. Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 323. 
336. See id. at 308 n.10, 323. 
337. See id. 
338. Id. at 362.  The complete budget from all sources is actually higher.  See 
Michael Dale & Louis M. Reidenberg, The Kids Aren’t Alright:  Every Child Should Have an 
Attorney in Child Welfare Proceedings in Florida, 36 NOVA. L. REV. 345, 356, (2012). 
339. See Dale, 2012 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 58, at 338–39; Dale & 
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GAL Program in Florida does not represent the legal interests of children in 
dependency and termination of parental rights cases.340  The GAL Program is 
not the child’s lawyer.341  Rather, the GAL Program, a party to dependency and 
TPR cases in Florida, only represents the child’s best interests.342  The child, of 
course, is a separate party in Florida.343  So the GAL Program’s lawyers cannot 
ethically represent another party—the child.344  The second part of the answer 
may be that, while the GAL Program describes itself as guardian angels, it tries 
to be the child’s friend, has 145 lawyers on staff, and actually only represents 
the best interests of half the children before the court; it is legally, ethically, and 
structurally incapable of solving the complex legal problems of the children 
before the dependency court.345 
Until this year, chapter 39 did not contain any special provisions for 
dealing with cases of medical neglect or those involving children with complex 
medical needs.346  Because of this, “parents [could] be found . . . neglectful or 
abusive [where the] observed problems [were] related to insufficient services or 
a natural change in medical conditions.”347  To correct these shortcomings and 
to ensure children are maintained in a minimally restrictive and nurturing 
environment, provisions were added to ensure that reports of medical neglect 
will be investigated by persons with specialized training,348 and a child 
protective team investigating such a case must consult with a physician with 
experience treating children with the same condition.349  The goal of these 
changes is to use a family-centered approach to allow children to remain at 
home where the parents are willing and able to meet the child’s medical needs 
with services.350 
Although this survey can only address a limited number of statutory 
changes, there are several additional provisions that require mention.351  First, 
the legislature has created multiple procedures and protocols related to the 
                                                                                                                   
Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 311. 
340. Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 311; see also FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM 
PROGRAM, FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 2, 5 (2009), available at 
http://www.guardianadlitem.org/documents/GAL-2009AnnualReport.pdf. 
341. See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 310–11, 327. 
342. Id. at 311, 327. 
343. See id. at 311. 
344. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.7(a)(2); see also FLA. STAT. § 39.01(51) (2014). 
345. See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 327, 330, 353. 
346. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(41)–(43); Fla. Prof’l Staff of the Comm. on 
Appropriation, Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement, S. 1666, Reg. Sess., at 12 (2014). 
347. Fla. Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement, S. 1666 at 12. 
348. See FLA. STAT. § 39.3068(1). 
349. See id. § 39.303(1). 
350. Id. § 39.3068(2). 
351. See supra Part V. 
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investigation and reporting of deaths and other incidents, involving children 
either in the care of, or who have been investigated by, the department.352  The 
relative caregiver program—which provides financial assistance to family 
members willing to care for a dependent child—was extended to assist persons 
who are not related to the child by blood or marriage.353  A three-year pilot 
program was established to pay for the costs associated with obtaining a driver’s 
license—including insurance—for children in foster care.354  Finally, multiple 
provisions were added to increase the overall competence of child welfare 
personnel, with an emphasis on increasing the number of employees with 
bachelor’s and master’s degrees in social work.355 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Legislature made substantial changes in the juvenile delinquency 
and child welfare law.356  In the latter area, several of the changes contain major 
constitutional infirmities.357  The Supreme Court of Florida heard only one 
juvenile law case involving a statutory analysis of the speedy trial rule.358  And 
finally, the intermediate appellate courts contained their long-standing approach 
to significant oversight of trial court rulings in both delinquency and child 
welfare areas.359 
 
 
 
                                                 
352. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 39.2015 (1). 
353. Id. § 39.5085(2)(a)(3). 
354. Id. § 409.1454(2). 
355. Id. § 402.403(1)–(6). 
356. See supra Part I. 
357. See supra Part V. 
358. State v. S.A., 133 So. 3d 506, 507 (Fla. 2014) (per curiam). 
359. See, e.g., S.L. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 120 So. 3d 75, 77 (Fla. 4th 
Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam). 
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